Education:
Ph.D., University of Virginia

Professional Activities:
I am a native of Genoa, Italy. I received my philosophical education and training at the University of Genoa and at the University of Virginia, where I earned my Doctorate. I have been at IU Northwest since the Fall of 2000. In my spare time, I play with my two children and make unevenly successful attempts at gourmet cooking. 

Recent Papers:

--“Aristotle on Improving One's Character,” Phronesis 45 (2000), pp. 205-219.

Abstract: Contrary to what most interpreters hold, in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle is not committed to the view that people of established vicious character could never become good. The paper proves this result (1) by giving a better reading of 1114 a 12-21, a passage which has traditionally been taken to assert that unjust and self-indulgent people are doomed to a lifetime of vice; (2) by showing that when Aristotle refers to self-indulgent people as “incurable”, he does not mean that they could never change, but only that they could not change as a result of external influences such as persuasion or punishment; (3) by proving that although Aristotle regards the desires of vicious people as determined by their character, there is room within Aristotelian moral psychology for the possibility that people of corrupt character become motivated to begin a process of moral reform. 

--“Did Aristotle Understand Moral Responsibility?”, presented at Indiana University Bloomington, November 3rd, 2001.

Abstract: Some interpreters have denied that Aristotle regarded human agents as morally responsible, that is as truly deserving of praise or blame for their actions. If this was indeed Aristotle’s view, then he did not differ significantly from Socrates and Plato, who notoriously held that the vicious person does not choose what is evil over what is good, but is simply mistaken as to what the good really is. This paper rejects the thesis that Aristotle did not work with a recognizable notion of moral responsibility. That his conception of responsibility is comparable to those of modern and contemporary moral thinkers is proved by analyzing his views on anger, punishment, the formation of character, and the phenomenon of self-deception in moral matters.