Professional
Activities:
I am a native of Genoa, Italy. I received my philosophical education and training at the University of Genoa and at the University of Virginia, where I earned my Doctorate. I have been at IU Northwest since the Fall of 2000. In my spare time, I play with my two children and make unevenly successful attempts at gourmet cooking.
Recent Papers:
-- “Aristotle’s Alleged Moral Determinism in the Nicomachean Ethics,” Journal of Philosophical Research 33 (2008): 19-32.
Abstract: Did Aristotle believe that upbringing determines character and character, in turn, determines action? Some scholars answer this question in the affirmative and thus read Aristotle as a determinist with little use for the idea that people are morally responsible for what they do. The present paper counters this interpretation by showing that a deterministic reading of Aristotle’s theory of action and character is indefensible in the face of the text. The author points to three main facts: (1) a passage in the Nicomachean Ethics shows conclusively that Aristotle did not regard upbringing as determining moral character; (2) the doctrine of character expounded in Nicomachean Ethics III does not entail that people can only act in conformity with their moral dispositions; and (3) Aristotle viewed alternate possibilities as genuinely open to moral agents, not as available to them only in principle (i.e. if they had received a different upbringing or had had different beliefs and desires).
-- “The Problem of Divine Inefficiency,” Think 17/18 (2008): 75-83.
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to discuss a difficulty for theism. I call it “the problem of divine inefficiency.” The difficulty arises from the inconsistency between the theistic assumption that God highly values human moral properties and the fact that such properties emerged very late in the history of the universe. I argue that the theistic view that God is rational requires that He should have facilitated the emergence of human moral properties shortly after the creation of the universe. Since this did not happen, theists face the challenge of explaining why God was inefficient in introducing human moral properties into the universe. The paper analyzes several possible theistic responses to the challenge and finds them all wanting.
-- “The Immorality of Horror Films,” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 20 (2006): 277-294.
Abstract: With the exception of pornography, the morality of popular forms of entertainment has not been studied extensively by philosophers. The present paper aims to start discussion on the moral status of horror films, whose popularity and success has grown steadily since the 1970s. In particular, the author focuses on so-called “slasher” or “gorefest” films, where the narration revolves around the graphic and realistic depiction of a series of murders. The paper’s main thesis is that it is immoral to produce, distribute, and view films of this kind. The reasons are traced back to two facts: 1) living the moral life requires being disposed to react compassionately to the sight of human victimization, and 2) the most violent horror films either overwhelm the spectator or promote a detachment from violence that may interfere with the development and maintenance of the correct reactive attitudes to human victimization.
-- “Theism and the Meaning of Life,” Ars Disputandi 6 (2006).
Abstract: Theists are inclined to assert that human life would be meaningless if there was no personal immortality and God did not exist. The present paper aims to evaluate the truth of this claim. The author first explores the conception of meaning that is at the roots of the theistic position. After pointing out some difficulties with it, the author shows that, on a plausible alternative interpretation of what it is for an activity to have meaning, human life would fully qualify as meaningful even if it were not inscribed in a universal divine plan.
-- “Aristotle on Improving One’s Character,” Phronesis 45 (2000): 205-219.
Abstract: Contrary to what most interpreters hold, in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle is not committed to the view that people of established vicious character could never become good. The paper proves this result (1) by giving a better reading of 1114 a 12-21, a passage which has traditionally been taken to assert that unjust and self-indulgent people are doomed to a lifetime of vice; (2) by showing that when Aristotle refers to self-indulgent people as “incurable”, he does not mean that they could never change, but only that they could not change as a result of external influences such as persuasion or punishment; (3) by proving that although Aristotle regards the desires of vicious people as determined by their character, there is room within Aristotelian moral psychology for the possibility that people of corrupt character become motivated to begin a process of moral reform. |
