Chairman Mao Tze-tung (Mao Ze-dong) and the Chinese political movements

Andrew Nathan, a political scientist specializing in modern Chinese politics, here draws upon primarily three works, one, a biography of Mao by Chairman Mao Tze-tung's private doctor Dr.Li, and the other, secret speeches Mao made between 1957-76, and a third book The Claws of the Dragion.  Combining a discussion of Mao's personality and his political strategies, Nathan tries to explain the nature of the political movements of the 1950s-1970s.

1. The juxtaposition of Communism and imperial power. (27-29)

Being a Communist leader, Mao did not adhere to the Puritanical ideals he called on the whole country to observe, where adulterers would be put in prison for years, and Communist life meant discipline and simplicity.  Throughout the 1950s, what he tried to do was to develop a power base that resembled that of Chinese emperors in history, an ambition very well captured by the slogan "Long live Chairman Mao!" (c.f. long live the queen/king in England.)  This imperial ambition was one reason he could not tolerate different opinions within the party.

2. Mao's ambivalence toward the West. (29)

As a product of the New Culture Movement (1920s), Mao wanted to introduce Western learning to some extent, although the West was labeled simultaneously imperial and bourgeoisie.  Hence his choice of Dr. Li, a returned doctor, as his  doctor.

3. Mao's mass mobilizations

Mao used ideological fervor to sustain economic development, not knowing it would lead to disaster.  He not only used it for economic development, but also as a way to get rid of his enemies through freeing up the people.

Nathan argues that the three pillar of Mao's power were: ideology (of Communism), the army, and his ability of "divide and rule." (31)

The political movements of the latter half of the 1950s were often factional struggles within the Communist Party: so Mao's struggle against those who wanted to emphasize "expertise"  in economic development led him to do large scale economic reform; the consequent loss of millions of lives led him to backstage in the Communist Party, hence his decision to bring about the Cultural Revolution to bring down the capitalist roaders.

What is new about Nathan's article here is the change of face of Mao in the 1950s that transformed from an attempt to offer the intellectuals a junior partnership in the regime, hence the "let one hundred flowers bloom" movement (35; also, see Jung Chang), to one of suppression of intellectuals and Mao's continued adherence to the mass political movement form in industrial development (the Great Leap Forward of 1958, also see Jung Chang). 

Nathan criticizes Mao as someone who had too little experience running a country.  He relied on a Marxist utopian description as the basis of his economic system in 1958, where all would eat without pay, according to his/her need. (37)  Consequently, Mao was not able to develop a viable economic system (39).

4. Change of the nature of state from Mao to Deng Xiaoping: totalitarian regime to police state? (45-48)

For Nathan, despite Mao's "dictatorship," Communist China under him was not able to develop an autonomous secret police apparatus.  But when it came to Deng Xiaoping, Mao's successor who started the economic reform after 1978, Nathan argues that under a market economy, an autonomous police apparatus came into being and China since entered a "police state."  See if you agree with him.