chinese foreign policies

Historically, Terrill quotes from John Wills, because of China's size, its bureaucratic unity and defensive military strength, there was relatively little need for alliances for defense, a trait still visible in Chinese foreign policies today.  Terrill cites the difficult foreign relations China has had in the past century as examples to support this view. (Terrill, 264)  In Communist China, Terrill asserts, the Chinese government wavers between over-arrogance and over-sensitivity to historical humiliation.  It often follows a defensive and self-unreflective approach in foreign relations, treating other countries either as above or beneath China, but not as an equal.  The outside world, such as the United States, Terrill argues, often caves in to Beijing's demands, treating China as a "Ming [Dynasty] vase" that was fragile and needed to be handled with care. (Timeline of Chinese Dynasties)

To support his arguments, Terrill gives a few examples, including:

• The U.S. policy toward Taiwan (one-China policy, Taiwan is a part of China) versus U.S. encouragement of the former Soviet Union's Baltic states.

• The U.S. cut trade deals with China even when Beijing attacked Vietnam in 1979.

• China condemns the Japanese censoring of history and refrain from discussion of Japanese invasion of China but PRC textbooks' censoring of Chinese history is not mentioned (Terrill, 284-286) .

• When President Jiang Zemin of PRC visited Harvard in 1997, all sensitive questions were withheld from him. (Terrill, 291-293)

Terrill also argues that certain characteristics of Communist China's foreign policies can be traced to traditional practices in Chinese imperial history, combined with a modern sense of humiliation by foreign powers, including:

• Ambiguous messages meant to confuse, impress, and put off balance, done through scripted banquets and ambiguous language (traditionally done by Chinese courts to provide flexibility for interpretation for itself)

• Posture of infinite patience (since no elected governments and no quick turnover in office, this was possible).

• Moral grievance from historical humiliation in the hands of Western powers (identification with third world countries against Western hegemony.  Terrill argues that it blocks Beijing from clearly focusing on the present, such as in the case of Japanese history textbooks). (above from 283)

• Conceal weakness with the appearance of strength, as suggested by a Song Dynasty (960-1279) classic, which minimized the history of foreign invasions in China;

• Combination of Legalism and Confucianism, reflected in the emphasis on the moral persuasion of the Chinese state, combined with realpolitik, (e.g. honor or not to honor marriage pacts with other countries, a traditional show of friendliness).  Example: President Jiang Zemin's visit to the US was a display of moral persuasion, a show of pro-Western friendliness, while President Clinton's return visit to China did not get any of the results anticipated, Terrill, 293-296)

  • Legalism: school of thought in the Warring States Period (475-221 BC) that emphasized the importance of law in social order.

  • Confucianism: the teaching of Confucius (551-479 BC) that emphasized the use of morals and rituals to foster good human behavior instead of law.

Terrill criticizes the U.S. Bush administration for any alliance with Beijing against terrorism because the Chinese state itself, as it is undemocratic, exercises terror on its people, and expresses surprise that for all the wrongs it does, Beijing's ego is bruised for not receiving sufficient respect.  (Terrill, 298-304)

While Terrill provides an interesting and often perceptive account of Chinese foreign policies, we can get a better idea of Chinese foreign policies by putting Terrill's arguments in perspective:

1. China's long history of dealing with countries smaller and less advanced than itself and the self-centeredness consequently developed certainly plays a role in China's foreign policy, but this role must be understood within the framework of international power politics.  China asserts itself as one of the power players in the world.  Power displays, however, vary from country to country and often (though not always) are tainted with cultural characteristics.  The display of Russian and American power, for instance, differ in the ideological backing.  Russia would seldom mention the term democracy, which seems to be a uniquely Western European and North American value.  Similarly, China's display of power varies from that of the US, especially when the Chinese military power is no rival to the US.  The "ambiguous messages," "moral grievance," "conceal weakness with strength," "combining Legalism with Confucianism" are specific ways of power display. 

2. While culture can be manipulated in foreign policies, culture is not identical to foreign policy. 

3. As China grows militarily, it may resort to more conventional ways of brandishing power, i.e. with force.

4. The "inscrutable" aspects of Chinese diplomacy, such as ambiguous rhetoric, a legacy of China's autocratic/imperial past, continues to exist today because there is no political transparency.  The government still does not have to explain everything to the public and be publicly accountable for what it says and does.  Presumably, with the growth of democracy will come greater political transparency and more predictable government behavior in foreign policies.